Misesian action theory is an approach to social theory, not just economics
/What if praxeology (deductive action theory in the tradition of Ludwig von Mises) is conceived as something much larger than merely the backstop for Austrian economics or a sort of pre-Austrian-economics warm-up act? In that case, economics ought to be better defined as one branch of praxeology among others. Since Mises kept mentioning economics as the “thus-far best-elaborated part” of praxeology, shouldn’t more thinkers be taking this up and working on advancing other such parts?
This is one of the questions addressed in my 2011 paper Action-Based Jurisprudence, which, among other things, sought to more explicitly define another branch that I am now calling the theory of legal concepts. I am now working on taking this approach further and in new directions, but meanwhile here is an update on the question of defining economic theory and other fields, as parts of praxeology. One element in what originally helped me get moving further in this direction of an enlarged vision for praxeology a couple years ago was Stephan Kinsella's compilation of references, “Mises: Keep it interesting,” (Mises Economics Blog [RIP], October 16, 2010).
Since writing the original paper two years ago, I have taken note of the discussion in Guido Hülsmann's 2003 introduction to the third edition of Epistemological Problems of Economics, entitled, “From Value Theory to Praxeology.” This describes Mises's process of working backward from subjective value theory to arriving at his formal concept of action. It contains a descriptor at one point of economics as that part of praxeology that deals with action that uses economic calculation. On this basis, I might suggest for economics: the study of aspects of action as they arise uniquely only within the context of an exchange economy in that the latter enables economic calculation.
We can briefly test out this “exchange economy” proposal (or some other proposal) for the case of defining economics by playing a game of takeaway: “No exchange economy? No prices.” Check. “No exchange economy? No interest rates.” Check. And then on down the list of what we think ought to be considered part of “economics” proper. "No exchange economy? No time preference." Well, no. Not so fast. There is time preference regardless of the presence/absence of an exchange economy, so this one doesn't pass. It looks like it must belong more to a "core" area of praxeology rather than to any particular specialized branch of praxeological investigation.
We might also then see Mises’s classic statement on the impossibility of economic calculation under socialism, “Economic calculation in the socialist commonwealth,” (original German 1920) in a new light. It becomes a particular instance of playing the takeaway game: “No private factor-of-production ownership? No (real) factor prices and thus no profit/loss calculation.” Check.
My most recent thinking on the general issue is that praxeology is a tool that we can use as one element in the study of just about anything involving human action. The parts or branches should then simply be defined by the sets of subject matter that we are using praxeology to investigate. I was pleased to see some work in this direction in criminology as presented in Renaud Fillieule’s 2012 Mises Memorial Lecture, “Misesian praxeology: An illustration from the field of sociology of delinquency,” delivered at the Austrian Scholar's Conference in Auburn, 10 March 2012, which I also recently mentioned here.
So we’re out here investigating what praxeology/thymology can show us if we apply it to issues x, y, and z, extending to all the things in the social sciences that we are interested in understanding better. This could become useful in the entirety of the social sciences—as opposed to the natural sciences—which I think is more what Mises had in mind with praxeology/thymology vis-à-vis natural science methods.
In other words, there ought to be plenty of work to do to carry forward the actual “program” that Mises launched, which was much larger than economics. It was a call for a revolution out of historicism (see especially Theory and History) and positivism (see especially The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science) in the social sciences as such and was by no means limited to economics. Economics was Mises’s own primary specialization within praxeology; it doesn’t have to be everybody else’s.
Reeva Steencamp's final message, academic hubris, and a legal philosophy view of the case
/A final message versus academic hubris
USA Today reported that, “The South African Broadcasting Corp. [SABC] aired the Tropika Island of Treasure program, showing the late Steenkamp — the victim of a Valentine's Day shooting at Pistorius' home — laughing and smiling in Jamaica when it was filmed last year."
And the Guardian noted that, “The SABC was also attacked by Rachel Jewkes, the director of the gender and health research unit at the South African Medical Research Council. "It sounds incredibly tasteless," she said. "I struggle to think what it would be like for her family to see her swanning around and being normal on TV."
Hmmm. Maybe try asking them?
USA Today: “Steenkamp's family said earlier Saturday that they had not been contacted by either the SABC — South Africa's national broadcaster — or the show's producers for permission to air it, but were not opposed to it because Reeva [Steenkamp] wanted everyone to see it.
"'Her last words to us personally was that she wants us to watch it,' Sharon Steenkamp said, hours before the program was shown."
Or ask the victim:
The Guardian quoting Steenkamp from the show: "'I think that the way you go out, not just your journey in life, but the way that you go out and you make your exit is so important. You've either made an impact in a positive way or a negative way, but just maintain integrity and maintain class and just always be true to yourself.'
"Before blowing kisses to the camera, she added: 'And I'm going to miss you all so much. I love you very, very much.'"
A legal philosophy take
There does not seem at this stage to be any controversy about whether Oscar Pistorius was the one who pulled the trigger and set in motion the objective cause of death of Reeva Steenkamp. This means the entire case will revolve around the question of whether the shooting was intentional or negligent.
Accidental already seems like quite a stretch, if the following is to be believed. The Guardian: "Media reports in South Africa continue to claim that Pistorius, 26, told police the shooting was a 'horrible accident' after he mistakenly believed 29-year-old Steenkamp to be an intruder. One newspaper suggested that he fired four shots through a bathroom door."
Shooting through a door at an unidentified target might be negligent at best (for shooting without successfully identifying the target), but "accidental" doesn't quite seem to fit even this account.
Without taking any position on the facts of the case, which remain sketchy, in my view, based on action-based legal theory (disclaimer: not necessarily equal to positive law in this or any other jurisdiction, but rather a philosophical position), the shooter took an action. This means there was a human means/ends structure. Firing the gun in a particular direction was the means. The end or objective of the action, what the person had in mind in taking the action, is what is contested, and the two stories contrast sharply: 1) to neutralize a threatening intruder or 2) to murder a woman in cold blood.
In both cases, however, the action objectively caused the death of the victim. This "objective causality stemming from an (intentional) action” element means the shooter ought to be liable for damages to the family, to insurers, etc., and this would be true in either case, whether the act was negligent or intentional. He took an action. That action created the harm. He carries the liability and responsibility for the results.
The main differential questions that stem from the negligence versus intent issue would seem to be: What kind of person is this? Can he be trusted? Is he dangerous? How should one treat him and deal with him (or not) now and in the future? And so on. What remains then, is the potentially tough task of establishing the actual facts of the case in such a way as to make the judgment of which it was—intent or negligence? Yet the key issue of personal liability and responsibility appears, in either case, to already be clear.
Bank robber chatting with Bill Murray illustrates self-control theory
/Fresh from robbing a bank in Tokyo, a robber saw film star Bill Murray and stopped to chat with him!
Soon, Tokyo police tackled him (the robber) in mid-conversation.
This is a perfect image to illustrate the essence of the low self-control theory of criminality in Gottfredson & Hirschi's 1990 A General Theory of Crime, an important book that I become aware of through the work of French scholar of the sociology of crime and contributor to the Austrian school of economics (a rare combination!), Renaud Fillieule (see his presentation on praxeology and criminology embedded below). They write on p. 89 that:
A major characteristic of people with low self-control [characteristic of most actual criminality] is a tendency to respond to tangible stimuli in the immediate environment, to have a concrete “here and now” orientation.
Moreover, police caught the man with "a knife and a bag filled with 455,000 Japanese Yen, or about 5,000 USD." Once again, this is a perfect image for Gottfredson & Hirschi's contention on p. 21 that:
Although it may be more glamorous and profitable for law enforcement [and news and entertainment media] to portray an image of crime as a highly profitable alternative to legal work, a valid theory of crime must see it as it is: largely petty, typically not completed, and usually of little lasting or substantial benefit to the offender.
The vast majority of actual crimes are just like this, "petty, not completed, and of little benefit to the offender." This event, too, would have gone mostly unnoticed and unreported, were it not for Bill Murray walking by.
Here is a fascinating 2012 lecture examining the field of the sociology of crime from a Misesian action-theory perspective.
Action-Based Jurisprudence II: Down under (and back again)
/
I gave a presentation at the wonderfully principle-centered 2nd annual Mises Seminar Australia in Sydney's central business district (CBD) on 2 December 2012. Here is a document version of my presentation, a close transcript arranged with selected content from the slides and rounded out with a list of readings.
Key themes included clarifying the difference between the ethical and the legal and differentiating "law" into five sub-disciplines, each with its own distinct domains and methods, conflating which (as is usually done) leads to serious problems (which we see all around us). It discusses who wins and who loses from contemporary complexity in legal definitions, and argues that the emerging action-based jurisprudence approach offers a better way of addressing the many contingent complexities of real life and culture without undermining fundamental principles of civilization in the process.

With Mises Seminar co-organizer and Liberty Australia co-founder and director Michael ConaghanDeveloping this for me started out as an attempt at a simpler restatement of the arguments in my August 2011 paper, Action-Based Jurisprudence: Praxeological Legal Theory in Relation to Economic Theory, Ethics, and Legal Practice," one that would be more accessible to people less versed in the background literature. As it developed, new territory and reformulations emerged. This included the three theory modules designed to help people grasp some difficult but crucial concepts without having to delve into stacks of academic books and articles to glimpse a solid initial understanding (after which, those stacks of books and articles can more profitably follow, and a strictly select list of them does, on the last two pages).
A substantially expanded and elaborated academic journal version, with more detailed references and footnotes and some additional new angles, especially on the relationship with action-grounded criminology (our understanding of what crime and criminality actually are), is also in the works.

With Professor Walter Block at 2nd Mises Seminar Australia (visiting Yanks!)There and back again
This was my first trip south of the equator. I had a wonderful time in Sydney and got to meet a number of people I had previously encountered only online, including among many others, organizing team members Michael Conaghan, Benjamin Marks, Washington Sanchez, Samuel Marks, and Anthony Coralluzzo. Before this weekend, I had only briefly met the legendary libertarian teacher/promoter and enthusiastic intellectual trouble-maker Professor Walter Block, but this time had the opportunity to speak with him at greater length. My presentation also came just after one of his (now in his 70s, he did five segments in two days and looked ready to do 12 more). I was stepping up right after someone who has been presenting at conferences since I was learning to walk, and I was touched afterwards that he referred back to content from my talk several times in his later segments.
I also got to talk at length with Michael Conaghan, co-founder and director of Liberty Australia, who is quickly becoming legendary himself in online discussion circles for regularly coming up with spot-on quotations from the relevant literature (even with occasional video clips of old Q&A sessions with Rothbard personally addressing the question at hand) and dropping them out of thin air into active discussion threads.
My last day was a solo trip by city bus to Bondi Beach and MacKenzies Bay. I told the waiter at the amazing Hurricane's Grill Bondi Beach that I didn't feel like leaving Sydney to return to the frozen German winter, but would rather send for my family to come down and join me. He just smiled and said this is the kind of feeling a great many people who visit Sydney seem to report. I could believe it. Maybe Hurricane's delivers to Germany?